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Abstract 
 
The widespread use of the Internet has contributed enormously towards the growth of 
e-commerce. Technological advances in mobile phones (e.g. Smartphones) have also 
made it possible to carry out e-commerce via mobile phones (m-commerce). M-
commerce involves the use of mobile devices such as mobile phones and PDA’s in 
carrying out electronic transactions. Applications in this domain range from normal 
information consumption to high security financial electronic transactions. Just like 
e-commerce, the security of m-commerce applications is critical, especially when it 
involves applications that deal with user sensitive data such as credit cards details, 
medical details etc.  
 
This thesis introduces a platform (e.g. Symbian, iPhone OS and Android OS) inde-
pendent way of carrying out secure authentication from a mobile device. This was 
done by designing, prototyping and evaluating a platform-independent authentication 
method called OSP. An investigation and prototype implementation of how m-
commerce applications can include secure payment capabilities was also presented. 
Questions that were answered in this study include; how do we verify that a user is 
who he claims to be and how do we carry out financial transactions in a secure way. 
 
Keywords: OTP, PCI DSS, Platform, SMS, SSO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 7 
1.1. Background .................................................................................................... 7 
1.2. Problem statement ......................................................................................... 8 
1.3. Purpose .......................................................................................................... 8 
1.4. Organization of thesis .................................................................................... 8 
2. Related work ..................................................................................................... 10 
2.1. Two-factor authentication ............................................................................ 10 
2.2. Single sign-on system .................................................................................. 10 
2.3. Strong authentication ................................................................................... 10 
2.4. Social Authentication .................................................................................. 11 
2.5. ECC-based Wireless Local Payment Scheme ............................................. 11 
2.6. Online payment service providers ............................................................... 11 
2.7. Summary ...................................................................................................... 12 
3. Methodology .................................................................................................... 13 
3.1. Data Collection ............................................................................................ 14 
3.2. Analysis ....................................................................................................... 14 
3.3. Validation .................................................................................................... 15 
3.4. Evaluation .................................................................................................... 15 
4. Existing systems ................................................................................................ 17 
4.1. Authentication systems ................................................................................ 17 
4.1.1. PayPal password login ............................................................................. 17 
4.1.2. WebSEAL Single Sign-on ....................................................................... 18 
4.1.3. AcrotOTP Mobile .................................................................................... 19 
4.1.4. Accumulate Mobile everywhere .............................................................. 20 
4.1.5. Authentify Out-of-Band ........................................................................... 21 
4.1.6. Summary .................................................................................................. 22 
4.2. Payment Systems ......................................................................................... 22 
4.2.1. PayPal Payment System ........................................................................... 22 
4.2.2. Localized payments systems .................................................................... 23 
5. Threat modeling ............................................................................................... 24 
5.1. Mobile Threats ............................................................................................. 24 
5.1.1. Mobile Viruses ......................................................................................... 25 
5.1.2. Mobile Worms ......................................................................................... 25 
5.1.3. Mobile Trojans ......................................................................................... 26 
5.1.4. Mobile Spyware ....................................................................................... 27 
5.2. Threat Model ............................................................................................... 28 
5.2.1. Assets to be protected .............................................................................. 28 
5.2.2. Users ........................................................................................................ 28 
5.2.3. Vulnerable points ..................................................................................... 29 
5.2.4. Attacks ..................................................................................................... 29 
5.3. Mitigating threats ......................................................................................... 31 
5.3.1. Cross site scripting (XSS) ........................................................................ 31 
5.3.2. Eavesdropping Attack .............................................................................. 32 
5.3.3. Replay Attacks ......................................................................................... 32 
5.3.4. Smishing and Vhishing Attacks ............................................................... 32 
5.3.5. MITB attack ............................................................................................. 33 
5.3.6. DoS attack ................................................................................................ 33 
6. Proposed method .............................................................................................. 34 
6 
 
6.1. OSP .............................................................................................................. 34 
6.1.1. Requirements ........................................................................................... 34 
6.1.2. Design ...................................................................................................... 35 
6.1.3. Pros and cons ........................................................................................... 35 
6.1.4. Prototype .................................................................................................. 36 
6.2. Secure payment approaches ......................................................................... 37 
6.2.1. Understanding how payment works ......................................................... 37 
6.2.2. PCI compliant approach ........................................................................... 41 
6.2.3. Third party approach ................................................................................ 41 
7. Evaluation ......................................................................................................... 44 
7.1. OSP authentication method evaluation........................................................ 44 
7.1.1. XSS attack ................................................................................................ 44 
7.1.2. Eavesdropping Attack .............................................................................. 45 
7.1.3. Replay Attacks ......................................................................................... 46 
7.1.4. Smishing Attacks ..................................................................................... 46 
7.1.5. Vhishing Attacks ...................................................................................... 46 
7.1.6. Man in the Browser Attack ...................................................................... 46 
7.1.7. DoS Attack ............................................................................................... 47 
7.1.8. Summary .................................................................................................. 47 
7.2. Payment approach evaluation ...................................................................... 47 
7.2.1. Security .................................................................................................... 48 
7.2.2. Development Time ................................................................................... 48 
7.2.3. Cost .......................................................................................................... 49 
8. Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 50 
8.1. Current and future work .............................................................................. 52 
Reference ................................................................................................................... 53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Mobile-commerce, also known as the next generation e-commerce, can be defined as 
any electronic transaction or interaction conducted using a mobile device such as a 
mobile phone or personal digital assistant (PDA) [1]. Carrying out electronic based 
services is becoming quite common via mobile devices. This is due to the emergence 
of Smartphones (mobile phone + PDA) with reasonable computing resources e.g. 
mini browsers, security primitives (certificates, encryption etc.) and so on. The fact 
that our mobile devices are always with us and rarely turned off makes m-commerce 
an attractive field for businesses. Thus, m-commerce has become a business model 
that serious enterprises can no longer afford to neglect.  
 
Smartphones has opened up new opportunities for enterprises within m-commerce 
and it has also provided users an easy way of carrying out online transactions. How-
ever, the security issues that arise with the growth in this field cannot be neglected. 
For example, how does one ensure that participants in an m-commerce transaction 
are who they claim to be (authentication)? Also, how does one support secure finan-
cial transactions in m-commerce businesses? These are the issues this paper will be 
addressing in the coming chapters. 
 
1.1. Background  
 
The following history of Mobile commerce was adopted and freely interpreted from 
Wikipedia [2]. 
 
 “Mobile commerce was born in 1997 when the first two mobile-phone enabled Coca 
Cola vending machines were installed in the Helsinki area in Finland. The machines 
accepted payment via SMS text messages. The first mobile phone-based banking ser-
vice was launched in 1997 by Merita Bank of Finland, also using SMS.” “Mobile-
commerce-related services spread rapidly in early 2000. Norway launched mobile 
parking payments. Austria offered train ticketing via mobile device. Japan offered 
mobile purchases of airline tickets.” 
“PDAs and cellular phones have become so popular that many businesses[specify] are 
beginning to use mobile commerce as a more efficient way to communicate with their 
customers. In order to exploit the potential mobile commerce market, mobile phone 
manufacturers such as Nokia, Ericsson, Motorola, and Qualcomm are working with 
carriers such as AT&T Wireless and Sprint to develop WAP-enabled smartphones. 
Smartphones offer fax, e-mail, and phone capabilities.”  
“Since the launch of the iPhone, mobile commerce has moved away from SMS sys-
tems and into actual applications.”  
 
Today, M-commerce applications can be used for different services such as Mobile 
ticketing, Mobile vouchers/coupons/loyalty cards, content purchase and delivery, 
location-based services, information services, mobile banking, mobile store front, 
mobile brokerage, auctions, mobile marketing and advertisement etc. 
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1.2. Problem statement  
 
M-commerce is used for a variety of products and services ranging from basic appli-
cations such as mobile marketing to high security mobile payment applications. Mo-
bile payments are now becoming a widely used medium for carrying out financial 
transactions. Ericsson, a telecommunication giant and a major player in the mobile 
payment industry, estimates that the mobile payment market will yield a profit of 20 
billion Euros by 2015 and a turnover of 600 billion Euros [3]. A mobile payment 
application must provide means for carrying out secure authentication and financial 
transactions.  
 
Authentication and secure payment is a major security issue when it comes to carry-
ing out mobile financial transactions remotely. Developers of such applications are 
always faced with questions such as; how do we ensure that the person requesting to 
carry out a financial transaction is who he claims to be? How do we carry out secure 
financial payments from a mobile device? There are several mobile payment applica-
tions (see chapter 4) providing some form of authentication/payment function, and 
installed on various Smartphones (iPhone, BlackBerry, Android phone, etc.) today.  
However, most existing solutions are platform dependent and each has its unique 
implementation for secure authentication and payment. For example, a solution im-
plemented in java for an Android phone will have to be re-implemented in Objective 
C in order to be used on an iPhone due to language restrictions. Another question 
which is obvious at this point is; how do we implement a method for secure authenti-
cation or payment which is compatible with all Smartphones? 
 
1.3.  Purpose  
 
The objective of this thesis work is to propose a secure platform-independent authen-
tication and payment method for m-commerce applications. To achieve this, the fol-
lowing research questions were looked into: 
 
1. What are the security threats that are currently faced by m-commerce systems? 
2. What are the necessary security requirements that must be met by a platform-
independent authentication and payment system? 
3. What are the current authentication methods/solutions available? 
4. What are the current payment methods/solutions available? 
 
1.4.  Organization of thesis 
 
Chapter 2: Previous studies in the area of authentication and payments are presented 
in this chapter. Here, we illustrate the relation and relevance of our studies to 
previous related work that have been done in the research community.  
 
Chapter 3: This chapter describes the method that what adopted during this thesis 
work. It gives an overview of the different stages involved in the research process. 
These stages include data collection, analysis, validation and evaluation.  
 
Chapter 4: There are several authentication and payment products/systems in use 
today. In this chapter, we investigated the security and architecture used in these 
systems, with the aim of understanding how a secure platform independent 
authentication and payment method can be designed.  
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Chapter 5: This chapter describes the various threats that are currently faced by the 
mobile community. In this section, we have created a threat model which helped us 
to identify and understand the possible threats that are faced by m-commerce 
applications and ways of mitigating them. 
 
Chapter 6: A method for carrying out platform independent authentication and 
payment via mobile phones is described in this chapter. This method was influenced 
by previous studies and current existing products. A prototype implementation of 
these methods as part of an m-commerce application is also presented. 
 
Chapter 7: An evaluation of the authentication method and the two payment 
approaches presented in chapter 6 are presented here.  
   
Chapter 8: Conclusions and future work for this thesis work are presented in this 
final chapter.  
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2. Related work 
 
We have studied various research works that have been done in the area of authenti-
cation with a focus on mobile devices. The studies were conducted on how a secure 
financial transaction is carried out. The essence of this section of the thesis work is 
not to only cite some of the important results that were obtained, but to also see their 
relevance to the research problem.  
 
2.1. Two-factor authentication  
 
Fadi Aloul, S.Z and Wassim El-Hajj addressed the problem of carrying out secure 
authentication via mobile devices [4]. They proposed the use of a two-factor method 
of authentication which makes use of something you have (mobile phone) and some-
thing you know (one-time password). The method involves the use of a mobile phone 
for the generation of a one-time password (OTP), or the use of SMS in retrieving a 
remotely generated OTP from a server. Results showed this two-factor authentication 
method to be a more secure form of verifying users than traditional password sys-
tems. They also showed how this method can be used to eliminate the problems that 
one-factor authentication methods (e.g. passwords) face. Their method provides a 
cheaper alternative to current two-factor authenticating systems (tokens, cards) wide-
ly used today. It does this by making use of the users’ mobile phone for OTP genera-
tion, therefore eliminating the extra cost involved in purchasing additional tokens and 
cards.    
 
2.2.  Single sign-on system 
 
When a user has several user accounts with different service providers, he would 
need to remember and use different user-ids and passwords while connecting to those 
accounts. The single sign-on (SSO) mechanism relieves users of having to undergo 
unnecessary multiple authentications for each service. In the paper titled “The study 
of multi-level authentication-based single sign-on system” [5], the authors pointed 
out that systems which have a single sign-on experience, assign the same level of 
security to each service providers within a distributed network. This according to the 
authors is not really secure. If one of the service provides within the distributed net-
work becomes compromised, then the single sign-on experience will tend to pose a 
threat to other service providers that require a higher level of security. The authors 
proposed a multi-level authentication mechanism (MLA-SSO), in which different 
security levels that are required by different service providers can be automatically 
analyzed and assigned by a server. This improves the flexibility, performance and 
security of the network. 
 
2.3. Strong authentication 
 
In the Research carried out by Do van Thanh et al [6], the authors introduced the 
concept of using the mobile phone device as a token for authentication instead of a 
traditional hardware token. The overall cost of using an additional device to carry out 
authentication is very high for organizations that have to maintain thousands of to-
kens. Also, users will have to carry around hardware tokens whenever they need to 
carry out authentication on the fly. The authors proposed the use of mobile phones as 
a replacement for hardware tokens as a way of solving the various issues described 
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above. They also discussed various ways that the mobile phone could be used as de-
vice tokens in a secure two-factor authentication process. 
  
2.4. Social Authentication  
 
A study [7] carried out by two researchers from McGill University in Canada pro-
posed an additional authentication factor to an already existing two-factor authentica-
tion (see 2.1). The authors Muthucumaru Maheswaran and Bijan Soleymani sug-
gested that this additional authentication factor (someone you know), should be high-
ly dependent on the social network the particular individual belongs to. That is, every 
individual who uses a mobile device as an authenticator needs to belong to a particu-
lar social network. In the case when a member of that particular network has lost his 
secret credentials or the mobile device, that person will require someone to vouch for 
him. During the process of vouching for someone, the secret credential is not sent to 
the voucher but to the individual who needs to be vouched for. This maintains the 
secrecy and privacy of the credentials and thus adds an additional level of security to 
the already existing system. 
 
2.5. ECC-based Wireless Local Payment Scheme 
  
Gianluigi Me and Maurizio A. Strangio conducted a study [8] which was driven by 
the problem of insecurity involved in the use of mobile phones for localized financial 
transactions. They studied the security issues present in mobile phone wireless com-
munication technologies (Bluetooth, IrDA and Wi-Fi etc.) such as Blue bugging, 
Bluesnarfing, Blue jacking etc. [9, 10]. They then presented a local payment scheme 
via mobile phones based on a Public key infrastructure (PKI). Security was ensured 
in the scheme by using secure cryptographic primitives and a standard compliant key 
agreement.  
 
The scheme covers the secure communication between a payer, payee and their re-
spective banks. A payer requests for an electronic check from his bank. The bank 
securely sends the electronic check with the payers’ signature bound to it. Payer and 
payee establish a secure connection, exchange public key certificates, and agree on a 
secret session key used for authentication. Payer on receipt of an encrypted invoice 
from payee returns an equally encrypted and digitally signed e-check. Payee signs, 
submits the check to his bank and receives a message on whether the check was ac-
cepted or not.  The result of this study was a prototype based on Bluetooth protocol 
stack and Elliptic Curve based cryptographic primitives.  
 
2.6. Online payment service providers 
 
Alan D. Smith conducted a study [11] on the use of online payment service providers 
such as PayPal. This was done by conducting interviews with 190 working adults 
from 18 different companies. The interview took place within the metropolitan area 
of Pittsburgh US, over a period of 4 months. The author pointed out certain disadvan-
tages of using online payment service providers. These disadvantages include: 
“PayPal is not a bank and, therefore, is not subject to regulatory and internal audits 
and the funds are not federally insured” [11] 
“PayPal relies heavily on security and service software that have showed to be vul-
nerable in the past. For example, “In the summer of 2000, PayPal and other online 
payment services were attacked by Russian hackers” [11] 
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However, based on the result from the survey conducted in the study, it was also 
shown that online payment service providers are widely used and have tremendous 
potential for continued growth.   
 
2.7. Summary 
 
Several studies have been conducted in the area of authentication and payments. 
Some studies [4 - 7] talked about the different techniques that can be used to build a 
secure authentication method. These techniques include two-factor, single sign-on, 
strong and social authentication. However, most research has been focusing on plat-
form (operating systems e.g. iPhone OS, Android etc.) dependent authentication solu-
tions, while less attention have been paid on platform independent solutions. One 
may conclude from this trend that platform dependent solutions are more secure. 
With this study, we showed that using a platform independent authentication method 
is adequate without compromising the security of the authentication solution. For 
example, using multiple factors increases the security of the authentication process. 
This concept of using multiple factors to strengthen the authentication method is sup-
ported in several studies [4, 6, and 7]. It is also widely used in current existing au-
thentication systems (see chapter 4).  
 
Two other studies titled ECC-based Wireless Local Payment Scheme [8] and online 
payment service providers and customer relationship management [11] present two 
different ways to make financial transactions. The first study presented a local pay-
ment scheme via mobile phone based on public key infrastructure. This does provide 
a solution for making transactions via mobile phones; however, the solution is plat-
form dependent and will not fulfill the purpose (see chapter 1.3) of this study. In the 
second study, the authors identified online payment services providers (e.g. PayPal) 
to be widely used, and with tremendous potential for continued growth. Online pay-
ment service providers can provide platform independent solutions; therefore our 
study will evaluate different ways in which such services can be integrated into m-
commerce applications. 
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3. Methodology 
 
This chapter describes the research approach used in this study. It involved research-
ing previous studies that were conducted in the area of authentication, as well as re-
viewing what underlining techniques current existing authenticating systems use. In 
addition various policies and regulations in the payment industry and current existing 
payment methods were studied in order to propose a payment method for m-
commerce applications that is both secure and platform independent. This approach 
was adopted in order to clearly understand and define a solution to the research prob-
lem. The diagram below depicts an overview of the research method. 
 
 
Figure 1: Overview of thesis methodology 
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3.1. Data Collection 
 
The process of gathering data was done from a number of important sources. Some 
of the sources included antivirus websites, research libraries etc. Most of the data 
collected were in the form of written text, PowerPoint presentations and videos, 
while the collection type was in the form of documents and media files. See the table 
below for more details. 
 
 Data source Type of data Data form  Collection type 
1 Antivirus/security sites [12 – 
14,31,34] 
Threat documentation Written text Documents 
2 Related research [4 – 7, 8, 11 
] 
Articles  Written text Documents 
3 Existing authentication sys-
tems [16-20] 
Videos, Articles and 
Demos 
Written PowerPoint 
presentations, Writ-
ten text and media 
formats 
Documents and 
media files 
4 Existing payment systems 
[21-23] 
Videos, Articles and 
Demos 
Written PowerPoint 
presentations, Writ-
ten text and media 
formats 
Documents and 
media files 
5 Payment industry policy and 
requirement (PIPR)[53] 
Documentation Written text Documents 
Table 1: Data Collection 
  
3.2. Analysis 
 
The collected data from data source 1 to 4 was analyzed and refined with the aim of 
obtaining useful information for the research problem at hand. Data source 5 was on 
the order hand used directly as criteria for evaluating the payment approaches pro-
posed in chapter 6.2. 
 
Data source 1 
Antivirus/Security sites carry out one primary function, and that is developing pro-
grams or providing security information that helps protect computer users against 
viruses and other computer threats. Antivirus companies maintain up to date docu-
mentation about various computer and mobile phone threats, thus this was a good 
source for gathering threats that exist against mobile devices. Information about mo-
bile threats was obtained from the following antivirus companies; F-secure [12], Sy-
mantec [13] and McAfee [14] and other security sites [31, 34]. 
 
Analysis 1 
Various categories of threats that occur in mobile devices were collected. The threats 
where studied to understand how they infect and propagate to other mobile devices. 
Ways of mitigating it was also researched and documented (see chapter 5.4).  
 
Data source 2 
Various related studies have been conducted in the area of authentication and pay-
ment via mobile devices. Some studies talked about using two-factors based authen-
tication methods due to the low level of security provided by one-factor authentica-
tion methods. Other studies propose authentication techniques such as single sign-on 
(see chapter 2.2), social authentication (see chapter 2.4), and so on. Due to the pay-
ment aspect of the research problem, studies such as “ECC-based wireless local 
payment scheme” and “Online payment service providers and customer relationship 
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management” were also studied. All these studies were chosen because they brought 
a great deal of knowledge about how similar research problems were approached in 
the past. 
 
Analysis 2 
Various related work was studied to understand the best way to handle our research 
problem; how to carry out secure platform-independent authentication and payment 
via mobile phones. This involved learning about the various research methodologies 
and technologies used. 
 
Data source 3 & 4 
Existing authentication and payment systems/products implement various authentica-
tion and payment methods. This makes it possible to investigate the underling me-
thods and techniques used by secure authentication and payment systems.  
 
Analysis 3 & 4 
The architecture and technologies used in the existing authentication and payment 
systems were analyzed with the aim of exploring how to develop a secure platform-
independent authentication and payment method for m-commerce applications (see 
chapter 4) 
 
3.3. Validation  
 
The results of all the analyses conducted on data obtained from the antivirus/security 
sites, related research, existing authentication and payment systems/products (see 
3.2) were validated by conducting Triangulation (see below).  
 
Triangulation 
Triangulation [15] is a method of validating data collected from different data 
sources especially when it comes to exploratory studies such as this work. Thus, this 
method was adopted based on its suitability to this study. For example, information 
obtained from one antivirus site was validated by examining contradictory and agree-
able information from other antivirus sites. The information is valid in the case where 
agreeable sites are more than contradictory sites and vice-versa. 
 
3.4. Evaluation 
 
A separate evaluation was carried out on the proposed authentication method and the 
payment approaches.  
 
Authentication method  
After analyzing the threats obtained from the various antivirus/security sites, we were 
able to come up with a threat model (see chapter 5). The threat model was used to 
understand how potential threats can compromise a system from an attackers point of 
view.  In our case, the threat model was then used to evaluate the security of the au-
thentication method, by investigating how well it mitigates attacks from the threat 
model. 
 
Payment methods 
On analyzing the existing systems, two approaches where payment can be made from 
mobile devices without disregarding the platform independent requirement were 
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identified (see chapter 6.2). The security of each approach was evaluated by analyz-
ing it against standards and polies in the credit card industry (see chapter 7.2). The 
card industry standards and requirements were used because it is legally required for 
any m-commerce application that wishes to transmit, store and process credit card 
details.  
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4. Existing systems 
 
In the second Chapter, we reviewed the studies that have been carried out in the area 
of authentication and performing payments in mobile and other devices. We were 
able to identify various methods of carrying out authentication and secure payments, 
and most of these methods are currently used in existing commercial sys-
tems/products today. Thus, this chapter documents our analysis of these existing 
systems with the aim of finding out the most secure and realistic way to authenticate 
and perform payments via mobile phones.  
 
4.1. Authentication systems 
 
During the explorative process, four different kinds of systems were identified in the 
market that claims to offer a secure authentication process. 
 
4.1.1. PayPal password login  
 
This is a system which makes use of a one-factor authentication. The strength of this 
system lies in the underlying fact that users are mandated to choose strong passwords 
(e.g. combination of different data types, restriction on short passwords etc.). 
Although a strong password can be chosen, such one-factor systems have been 
shown to be vulnerable to attacks such as password cracking and is not considered 
secure enough.  
 
How it works 
PayPal [16] ensures that users register their personal details (e.g. password) which 
are then used for verification during the login process. A PayPal user intending to 
purchase goods from an m-commerce store is redirected to PayPal where he is asked 
to supply his User ID and Password. PayPal verifies the authenticity of the 
credentials entered by the user. It allows the user to proceed and finalize the payment. 
 
 
Figure 2: PayPal authentication process flow 
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4.1.2. WebSEAL Single Sign-on 
 
The WebSEAL authentication system [17] relies on a single sign-on mechanism to 
give subscribers premium access to services through a portal on their mobile devices. 
All subscribers of a particular telecom operator are already authenticated by their 
trusted telecom gateway (for example, WAP or i-mode gateway). At the same time 
when users want to access services through the portal on their mobile devices, they 
would need to also provide another form of credential. This therefore prolongs the 
process of authentication for mobile clients. WebSEAL Single sign on helps to 
eliminate the inconveniences that are caused by authentication process. In the case 
where a WAP gateway is used, WAP traffic is converted to HTTP traffic by the 
gateway and login credentials are embedded into to HTTP headers. The WAP 
gateway makes use of a Radius server to perform client authentication. For a 
successful user authentication, client’s personal details (e.g. telephone number, 
MSIDSN) are extracted from the SIM card.  
How it works 
 
Figure 3: WebSEAL authentication process flow 
 
When a user wants to access a premium service or resource through a single portal or 
application on his mobile device, the user sends authentication requests to the WAP 
gateway. The user’s information or credentials are retrieved and inserted into an 
HTTP header. HTTP requests are sent to the WebSEAL with the single sign-on  
HTTP header inserted into the streams of data. When WebSEAL receives the request 
packets, it retrieves the login credentials of the mobile clients and checks if a login 
session exists for that particular user. In the case when the user does not have a 
particular login session, WebSEAL then checks with the necessary authorization 
service if the user is within the trusted IP list. The trusted IP list includes all 
subscribers from a particular telecom gateway, and in that case, once authenticated 
by the trusted gateway, mobile clients IP is automatically included in the list of 
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trusted IPs.  If the client’s IP is trusted, access is granted to the particular service and 
a login session is created. The user is then redirected to the mobile portal to enable 
the user to have access to the requested service.   
 
4.1.3. AcrotOTP Mobile  
 
This authentication system [18] employs two-factor authentication by using a mobile 
device as the hardware token. The mobile device possesses an OTP generator module 
that generates random one-time passwords. The AcrotOTP system is made up of a 
container which holds the Acrot keys used for generating Random OTP. The Acrot 
keys are protected by cryptographically strong encryption. The system is made up of 
an authentication server which is used to verify that the OTP entered by the user is 
indeed a valid token.  
 How it works 
 
 
Figure 4: AcrotOTP authentication process flow 
 
User initiates login process with a commercial site. The site prompts user to enter a 
passcode. User launches AcrotOTP application on his mobile phone and subsequent-
ly generates a passcode with the application by entering his pin code. User enters the 
generated passcode into the commercial site and the entered passcode is verified with 
the AcrotOTP authentication server. The user is either granted or denied access based 
on the results returned from the authentication server.    
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4.1.4. Accumulate Mobile everywhere  
 
The Accumulate [19] Mobile Everywhere (ME) authentication system makes use of 
the mobile device as hardware token. This is more secure than hardware token used 
with online banking because the mobile device is always in possession of the 
customer. In order for such a system to be successful, it makes use of two different 
authentication parties. The ME mobile client application generates the OTT and the 
ME transaction server works as an authentication server that verifies the validity of 
the OTT entered by the user. This system ensures that the OTT can only be used once 
to validate a particular authentication session. A strong 2048 bits RSA encryption is 
used to ensure that the OTT is not compromised during the exchanges.  
 
How it works 
 
Figure 5: Accumulate ME authentication process flow 
 
A user accesses his web account by launching the Accumulate ME client application. 
Once the application is launched, a connection is automatically established between 
the application and the Accumulate Transaction server. The user then logs into the 
ME client application using his personal identification number. The client’s login 
detail is sent to the transaction server for verification. If the details are found by the 
server to be authentic, the user is allowed to select “choose login” option on the 
Accumulate ME client application. A one-time ticket (OTT) is sent directly from the 
Transaction server to the ME client application. This enables the user to then 
continue the financial transaction by entering his OTT into the commercial web page. 
The webpage server verifies the OTT entered with the Accumulate Transaction 
server. Finally, the user is allowed to log in if the returned result is OK.  
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4.1.5. Authentify Out-of-Band  
 
This system [20] provides a multi-level authentication mechanism which includes 
"something the user has”, “something the user is" and "something the user knows". 
Out-of-band method requires the customers to make a call to confirm a transaction. 
This ensures that a transaction can be terminated if any fraudulent activity is 
discovered during the process. This prevents Man-in-the browser attack which is an 
attack that is always targeted against the verification process of a financial 
transaction.The Authentify OOB system also makes use of two separate 
communication channels; one channel through the Internet and another through the 
mobile network. 
How it works 
PC Mobile Device AS PSTNWeb server
2.  EXml(user_details, mobile number) 
3.  Randomly generated OTP
4.  OOB call Out-of-band call to 
the user requesting to 
confirm OTP, 
user_details and 
mobile number
5.  Receive OOB call()
Call sent to 
Authentify AS 
to Confirms if 
data entered is 
valid 8.  Access granted to the user
User
7. Verification 
Ok
6.b Call(voice:UD,random generated 
number)
6.a Call(voice:UD,random generated number)
        6.c Call(voice: .,.)
1. init login
 
Figure 6: Authentify authentication process flow 
 
The User uses the PC to begin an authentication session. The account details and 
mobile number of the user are sent from the corporate network to the Authentify au-
thentication server in an XML encrypted format. The Authentify authentication serv-
er sends a randomly generated number which is displayed automatically on the user 
pc screen. At the same time, Authentify authentication server makes an out-of-band 
call to the user over the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). The user orally 
confirms his details (randomly generated number) through his unique voice over the 
PSTN to the Authentify authentication server. The Authentify authentication server 
sends an XML message to the web server confirming the identity of the individual. 
The web server grants access. 
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4.1.6. Summary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multiple 
Channel 
 
Multiple-factor 
authentication 
 
No  
Additional 
Hardware 
 
Platform 
Independent 
 
Security 
Critical 
Domain 
     PayPal 
 
 
 
 
 √ √ √ 
Web SEAL       
SSO 
 
 
 
 √ √ √ 
AcrotOTP 
System 
 √ √  √ 
Accumu-
late ME 
 √ √  √ 
 
Authentify √ √ √ √ √ 
Figure 7: Properties of authentication systems 
 
The table above summarizes a number of key properties which are considered neces-
sary for a platform independent authentication method. The authentication method is 
intended for use in systems that require adequate level of security and therefore re-
quires different layers of security to be put in place to ensure data integrity, confiden-
tiality and availability. AcrotOTP, Accumulate ME, Authentify and various other 
products in the market adopt multiple-factors as a way of enforcing multiple layers of 
security. A system which is platform dependent like AcrotOTP and Accumulate ME 
need some amount of cryptographic encryption to ensure that sensitive data stored on 
the platforms are not compromised. 
 
4.2. Payment Systems 
 
While conducting literature review on related studies (see chapter 2.6), we came 
across a widely used platform independent way of making payment electronically by 
using online payment service providers such as PayPal [21], Google checkout [22] 
and Authorize.net [23].  
  
4.2.1. PayPal Payment System 
 
This system gives customers the financial capacity to make purchases from online 
stores. The customer has two options (1) creating an account with PayPal which is 
funded through his credit card or by his bank account (2) Inputting his credit card 
details during the course of payment without having to register for an account. When 
payments are successfully carried out, the amount of the transaction is transferred 
into the merchant account of the seller. Online stores that make use of PayPal to re-
ceive payments, do not have to implement compulsory requirements (see chapter 
6.2.1) set by the credit card payment industry because these industry requirements are 
already implement by PayPal. This saves the online store time, money and resources 
needed to implement these requirements themselves. 
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How it works  
PayPal works with a number of online commerce shops today. The predominant one 
today is e-bay. When a customer on e-bay wins a particular auction for goods he has 
bided online, on paying for the goods, he is directed to a web page where he is given 
options to make a payment through a number of payment methods (e.g. Visa, Master 
Card or by PayPal). When the mobile user selects the PayPal payment option, he is 
redirected to a PayPal page. The user confirms the payment transaction and PayPal 
will then transfer the money from the user’s bank account to the merchant e-bay ac-
count. After that, a confirmation email or SMS is sent to both the seller and the buy-
er.    
 
4.2.2. Localized payments systems 
 
“Localized payment systems” refer to all localized payment systems which imple-
ment the compulsory requirements set by the credit card industry. These systems are 
quite common among big online stores who have the resources to implement all the 
compulsory requirements. These localized payment systems process, store and 
transmit customer’s card information without redirecting customers to third party 
online payment service providers like PayPal, Google Checkout etc. Examples of 
such organizations include Power VoIP [24]. 
 
How it works 
The implementation of a localized payment system is unique to an organization. A 
high-level description of how it works involves the receipt of transaction details from 
interested buyers. The transaction information is processed by transmitting it via 
backend functions to a chosen gateway. The gateway handles the actual processing of 
the transaction, and notifies the merchant when payments are completed. 
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5. Threat modeling  
 
Over more than 200 mobile device threats have been reported in the last decade. All 
reported threats have been seen to be highly dependent on the type of mobile device.  
For example the SymbianOS has reported more viruses than any other brand. It is 
believed that, the number of threats would grow exponentially as long as mobile de-
vices become more sophisticated. That is, as long as the speed, technological ad-
vancement and commerce demand for transactions to be carried out on mobile devic-
es increases, the stakes for attacking mobile devices and their applications will also 
increase. Some of the mobile device manufacturers like Apple have put in place secu-
rity measures to control what software gets installed on their platform. Although such 
measures are currently in place, hackers have been able to jailbreak [25] such devices 
opening the platform to new vulnerabilities. The goal of this chapter is to define a 
threat model that can be used to verify the security of m-commerce based authentica-
tion methods.  In order to accomplish this, we first identified various properties from 
which threats can be classified. These include behavior, environment, and fami-
lies/invariants. We then identified various mobile threats that exist today by going 
through several antivirus threat databases and other security sources. With these on 
hand, we were able to come up with a threat model for m-commerce applications and 
how to mitigate them.  
 
5.1. Mobile Threats 
 
An ordinary computer threat like a computer virus is not in any way different from 
the mobile virus, in that they exhibit the same behavior such as propagating from one 
vulnerable device into another. The difference lies in its adaption, that is viruses on 
mobile devices are specially adapted for the cellular environment whereas the later it 
is adapted for networks of connected PCs. When a threat is discovered in a mobile 
device, security experts classify the threat based on three main categories. These in-
clude: 
 
1. Behavior 
2. Environment (operating system) 
3. Families and Invariant. 
 
All threats have a particular behavior by which they can be identified or grouped. 
These are viruses, Trojans, worms and spyware. A virus or Trojan or worm or spy-
ware is like any normal computer program. So, when a program is seen to duplicate 
itself from one device to another, then such a program based on its behavior is cate-
gorized as a worm or virus. If it is seen to be stealing certain information from the 
device to some remote server then it may be categorized as a Trojan. Security experts 
will further investigate the kind of environment that the threat operates in. Symbia-
nOS has reported a lot more threats than any other mobile platform. Why? It has been 
reported by Nokia that hackers are able to bypass the security platform thus allowing 
users to execute unsigned code. This gives users or hackers the access to execute 
unsigned code on files and areas of the SymbianOS that they initially had no access 
to.  Finally, the threats are then grouped into a particular family. For example, Tro-
jan.SimbianOS.Skuller [26] has 31 different invariants or complex forms. iPhone 
Ikee has two different invariants that are Ikee-A and Ikee-B. A more detailed descrip-
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tion of these and more threats based on their behavior is given in the following sub-
sections. 
 
5.1.1. Mobile Viruses 
 
They are similar to computer viruses with the ability to spread from one infected de-
vice to another by propagating through Bluetooth or SMS. 
 
This was the first form of threats that were faced by computers. Examples include Elk 
Cloner from 1982 [27], Brain Computer Virus [28]. They existed even before the Internet 
became the main source of communication. Back then, viruses were distributed mainly 
by installing them manually on the target computer. Viruses became an attractive form of 
attack for adversary when the Internet became widely used. This was due to the ease of 
virus infection, which was mostly via email attachment, video streaming etc. Today, vi-
ruses are becoming less common amongst malicious ware writers (both professional cy-
ber criminals and normal hackers) due to the efficiency of antivirus protection (e.g. Sy-
mantec, MacAfee etc.). More stealthy and resilient form of attacks are widely used and 
preferred over normal viruses today. Examples of these threats include Trojans and 
Worms.  Based on this trend, computer viruses are less common today, and even more so 
in mobile devices. Example of one of the few viruses on mobile phones is a proof of con-
cept virus called WinCE.Duts [29]. 
 
WinCE.Duts 
This malicious program was released in 2004. It infects mobile devices that run under 
Windows CE. WinCE.Duts is an Advanced Risc Machine (ARM) processor program that 
runs with a total size of 1520 bytes [29]. This malicious program when ran displays the 
following message “Dear User, am I allowed to spread”. If the user agrees to install it, 
then the virus infects all non-infected executable files that are stored in the root folder. 
The virus writes itself to the ending of the files and establishes an entry point at the be-
ginning of the file. Although it has no payload, the intended purpose was to demonstrate 
that it was possible to infect mobile devices with viruses.  
 
5.1.2. Mobile Worms 
 
Mobile Worms are self-replicating programs that execute independently and travel 
across the mobile network.  
    
Commwarrior  
Commwarrior [30] is a worm that was discovered in 2005 and originated from Rus-
sia. Its targets SymbianS60v2 and it is propagated through bluetooth and MMS. 
Propagation through MMS medium occurs by sending an infected SIS file via MMS 
messages to other devices. The devices become infected on opening the attached 
copy of the file. The problem with this file is that it may be named differently and 
this makes it apparently difficult for a normal user to know whether the mms mes-
sage received is a SIS file or not. In the case of propagation through the bluetooth 
medium, the worm uses the bluetooth of the infected device to search for victims 
within the devices’ bluetooth range. It then sends the infected SIS files to any device 
it successfully pairs to. 
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iPhone IKEE-B 
This was discovered in 2009 two weeks after the emergence of IKEE-A [31] botnet. 
Just like the IKEE-A botnet, it converts the jail broken iPhone into a self propagating 
worm and infects other iPhone devices by exploiting a vulnerability in ssh[32]. That 
is, it propagates by scanning specific IP address ranges for SSH services (An exam-
ple port 22/TCP) and attempts to connect to those services as root by using the de-
fault password apline [32]. IKEE-B [33] botnet differs from the IKEE-A botnet, be-
cause it contains a command and control logic that enables the infected iPhones to be 
controlled by a master botnet. Each infected iPhone becomes a bot which is pro-
grammed by a command and control(C&C) logic server. The server controls logic 
and redirects infected phones to new C&C remote servers every 5 minutes. IKEE-
client creates a unique ID, enabling the Command and control logic to send custom 
logic to individual bot clients.  The botmaster is able to upload and execute shell 
commands on all infected iPhone botclients. 
 
Megoro 
Megoro [34] infects SymbianOS mobile devices and was discovered in 2010. It 
propagates from one infected phone to another be sending links to a SISX executable 
file (via SMS) to contacts on the infected phone.  An automatic download occurs 
once the link is visited, thereby infecting the devices with the worm. Megoro just like 
any other worm can replace files and carry out malicious functions based on its payl-
oad. 
     
5.1.3. Mobile Trojans 
 
A Trojan (sometimes called Trojan horse) is a malicious program that masquerades 
as a harmless legitimate program. The program initially appears to carry out useful 
services before it is installed by unsuspecting users. It however also contains dis-
guised malicious functions that can harm the mobile phone. The malicious function 
can be used to log user key strokes, carry out the modification or deletion of impor-
tant files and install remote software on the mobile phone. 
 
Zitmo 
Zeus in the Mobile (Zitmo) [35] is a Trojan horse that intercepts SMS messages (e.g. 
OTP) that banks send to customers during an online banking transaction. The aim of 
this attack is to circumvent the confidentiality behind two-factor SMS authentication 
and approve financial transaction without the knowledge of the customer. The Trojan 
when installed on the mobile devices monitors incoming SMS by using the SMS 
stack for its own benefit without the user knowing of its presence. The Trojan uses 
cross-site scripting to gather information about the mobile user such as mobile 
number and model (e.g. BlackBerry, Symbian phone). It then sends an SMS 
containing an executable link to the appropriate (based on the mobile model) 
malicious Zeus program (e.g. BlackBerry jar, Symbian Packages for SymbianOS). 
On infection, the Trojan installs a database where it stores all the information it 
steals. It later sends the stolen information via SMS to the adversary based on its 
configuration.  
 
Geinimi 
Geinimi [36] is embedded into a series of pirated Android applications that causes 
them to behave as Trojans. It was discovered in late 2010. This malicious software 
possesses the ability of storing and sending personal information from the victim’s 
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device to remote servers. Malicious capabilities of Gemini include: SMS monitoring, 
harvest and send device data, silently download files, launch browsers with pre-
defined urls etc. An Android device gets infected with the Trojan when a user installs 
a pirated Gemini infected applications from a third party repository. To ensure that 
communication between the Gemini code and the remote servers are kept confiden-
tial, the adversary encrypts the communication using a weak DES cipher. 
 
JiFake 
JiFake [37] is a Trojan that was discovered in 2010 and affects J2ME OS based mo-
bile devices. This malware appears to create a backdoor for other viruses and worms 
affecting the mobile device. JiFake monitors the victim’s online activities and steals 
personal information such as credit card details .The stolen data is then sent to the 
adversary’s remote servers. Mobile devices get infected with JiFake when unsuspect-
ing users download them unknowingly from compromised websites. 
 
5.1.4. Mobile Spyware 
 
Mobile spyware are spy programs that perform certain unauthorized functions with-
out the consent of the mobile users. It can be used to listen to every call, view SMS 
messages or perform a stealthy monitoring of the users activities.  
 
Cell Phone Recon  
Cell Phone Recon [38] is a mobile spyware that was discovered in 2010. It infects all 
mobile platforms except the IPhone. Once installed on the device, the user finds it 
extremely difficult to know that such malicious program is installed because it pro-
vides no application icon. The software performs all forms of monitoring (e.g. View 
text messages and View HTML email content including embedded images, etc) and 
in addition provides hackers with an administrator website from which to carry out 
the monitoring process. So far, four different variants have been discovered. 
 
Trusters Spy Phone 
This is another spyware [39] that was discovered in early 2010. It affects a number of 
Operating systems which includes SymbianOS, Windows Mobile and BlackBerry. 
Once installed on the victim's mobile device, the adversary is able to monitor the 
mobile communication of the victim. This threat can only be installed when the 
adversary has physical access to the device. This spyware application can be 
remotely controlled via SMS, forward and record incoming SMS messages, listen to 
surrounding audio and listen to both sides of a conversation. 
 
NeoCall 
NeoCall [40] was discovered in the late 2009 and affects SymbianOS and Windows 
Mobile platforms. It is a spyware which when installed on the target mobile device, 
enables the adversary to remotely issue SMS commands to retrieve requested data. It 
performs all the function as the Trusters Spy phone and in addition performs the 
following functions: localization of GPRS coordinates of the device to enable the 
adversary pinpoint the location of the victim, retrieve SIM card details etc. Just like 
the Trusters Spy Phone, the adversary needs to gain physical access to the device in 
order to install the NeoCall spyware. 
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5.2. Threat Model  
 
Whenever a security analyst is called upon to evaluate the security of a system, he 
first would have to create a threat model of the application he intends to evaluate or 
design. This is necessary to enable him to fully assess the possible threats that may 
occur by looking at the system from the attacker’s point of view. We will describe a 
threat model in the next section in order to identify the kind of threats that can be 
faced by the authentication system. In order to successfully create a threat model for 
an m-commerce application, one would first need to understand the target system. 
We did this by first identifying the system assets, system users and vulnerable points. 
We weren’t able to come up with possible attacks for the threat model based on this 
information and from the various mobile threats that we have identified to exist today 
(see 5.1). We have also investigated and documented possible ways of mitigating 
attacks identified in the threat model. 
 
 
5.2.1. Assets to be protected 
 
In order for users to successfully prove who they are during an authentication 
process, they will have to provide certain authentication data and in some cases per-
sonal data. The security of these data must not be compromised during the authenti-
cation process or via vulnerabilities in the authentication method. 
 
User data  
The confidentiality, integrity and availability of user data must be assured at all 
times. Examples of such data include the names, telephone number, address, credit 
card details etc. 
 
Authentication data  
A system verifies a user during authentication by requesting for some secret informa-
tion (OTP, password, pin, etc.) which only the user knows. For that reason, these 
authentication data must be securely protected from getting into the hands of any 
other person. 
 
5.2.2. Users 
 
A system cannot be fully evaluated unless a clear picture of all those that will be us-
ing the system is available. In a secure system, security privileges, access and data 
are made available only to a certain group of users while it is blocked for others. 
Therefore, a good understanding of the different users that can and will interact with 
a system must be taken into consideration when designing secure systems. 
  
Legitimate users 
A legitimate user is the person who is the rightful owner of an asset, or that has ex-
clusive access to certain system privileges. An example of a legitimate user is the 
owner of a credit card used in a financial transaction. 
 
Adversaries 
This is the person who intentionally tries to acquire assets which does not belong to 
him, or maliciously tries to gain system privileges which he is not entitled to. 
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Administrators 
Administrators are persons who have been legally mandated by the organization to 
handle day to day running of the m-commerce system. Tasks carried out by adminis-
trators include system modification, account deletion and so on.  
 
5.2.3. Vulnerable points 
 
Inputs and output points are avenues in which users or data enters or leaves the sys-
tem’s trusted network. These entry points are vulnerable to attacks because they 
serve as the only way the attacker can have access to the system resources. 
 
Communication channel 
Smartphones provide access to applications via several communication channels. 
These channels serve as entry and exit points to m-commerce applications and are 
vulnerable to different types of attacks. Examples of communication channels on 
Smartphones include short message service (SMS), Bluetooth, http etc.   
 
Web browsers 
Most m-commerce applications reside on remote servers and are accessed via web 
browsers such as opera mini, safari and so on. Thus, vulnerabilities in these browsers 
will also affect the security of the m-commerce application. 
 
Mobile phone OS 
In most cases, an application implemented on a mobile phone is dependent on the 
mobile phone operating system (OS) for communications with the system processes 
and hardware. Popular OS include Android, iPhone, Symbian etc. A security hole in 
any of these operating systems could be used as an entry point into attacking the m-
commerce application that resides on them. An example of such a case is when an 
adversary gains administrative rights to an OS. He can for instance configure the se-
curity settings of the default Internet browser to allow connections to unsecure web-
sites. 
 
5.2.4. Attacks 
 
Cross site scripting (XSS) 
This attack has been demonstrated to be possible on mobile phones as illustrated in 
Zitmo (5.1.3). Cross site scripting involves a process where an adversary attacks an 
m-commerce website by embedding malicious html, CSS, JavaScript or VBScript via 
various vulnerable points, in order to steal data from unsuspecting visitors [41]. For 
example, a dynamic website that allows user to enter comments on its sites (such as 
Facebook) can be XSS attacked.  
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<script> 
new Image().src="http://adversarysite.com/log_cookie? 
stolen_cokie="+encodeURI(document.cookie); 
</script> 
Figure 8: Sample XXS attack 
 
An adversary can attach the malicious script (see Figure above) to a comment entered 
on a popular site. If the site happens to be vulnerable to XSS, then cookies of visitors 
(which may contain usernames, passwords) will be sent to the adversary site on ad-
versarysite.com. This will happen to every person that visits the page were the com-
ment and script resides. 
 
Eavesdropping Attack 
Eavesdropping [42, 43] creates the opportunity for adversaries to listen to or possibly 
extract personal details and information of their victims. Eavesdropping can be car-
ried out through a number of ways. One way is by installing a spyware on the system 
(see 5.1.4). Another way is by using a network sniffer on the network to capture and 
reassemble packet as they are transmitted across the network. 
 
Replay Attack 
This is a form of attack [44] in which the attacker intercepts a valid data during 
transmission and maliciously replays it. For example, a user is given a session token 
after successful authentication. An attacker can then intercept this session token and 
replay it to gain access to the restricted account session at a later time. 
 
Smishing and Vhishing Attacks   
Smishing [45] is similar to Phishing attacks in that the attacker sends SMS messages 
to a legitimate user claiming to be an established entity in an attempt to obtain user 
information and details. This form of attack is difficult to discover especially when 
the URL is well crafted by the adversary. Smishing attacks almost always contain 
messages that require you to carry out an “immediate action”. Sometimes, such ac-
tions may lead to victims revealing their personal details like credit card information 
and so on. Whereas Smishing makes use of the SMS, Vhishing on the other hand 
makes use of voice to carry out phishing attacks. For example, an adversary sends an 
email requesting the victim to make a call. On calling the number, a voice response 
system is activated requesting the victims’ financial details. The deceptive nature of 
Vhishing lies in the underlying fact that victims are deceived into thinking that they 
are dealing with their legitimate banks or other recognized organizations. 
 
Man in the Browser Attacks 
MITB [46] is an attack that is aimed at intercepting streams of data that is sent over a 
secure communication channel between the customer’s web browser and the mobile 
store. The adversary or hacker would normally embed a Trojan in the customer’s web 
browser so that whenever the customer visits online banking sites, the mobile threat 
is activated to modify of the data entered. Using html injection, the Trojan displays 
fake web pages to the victim so that the victim gives away his transaction credentials. 
The stealthy nature of this attack makes it difficult to detect since any activity carried 
out by the Trojan seems to be coming from the user’s browser. For example, a MITB 
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Trojan embedded in the browser can change messages received from the mobile store 
before displayed by the user’s browser.  
 
DOS Attack 
Denial of Service [47] is an attack where an adversary attempts to deprive the victim 
of services that he requires. Mobile worms are mostly responsible for causing DoS in 
mobile devices. For example, a DoS attack can occur when an adversary continually 
requests for Bluetooth pairing with a victim’s device. The result may be that the vic-
tim’s device becomes unresponsive due to packet flooding from the adversary. DoS 
can also occur when the victims Bluetooth stack tries to allocate resources to the ad-
versary’s requests that never complete the handshaking protocol. This eventually 
leads to exhaustion of Bluetooth stack memory.  
 
5.3. Mitigating threats 
 
 This sections aims to cover some known and proven ways of mitigating the attacks 
described in the threat model (see 5.2.4). These attacks include XSS, Eavesdropping, 
Smishing/Vhishing, DoS, MITB and Replay attacks. 
 
5.3.1. Cross site scripting (XSS) 
 
XSS can be mitigated in different ways, but the two most common and effective 
ways are filtering and escaping [48]. 
 
Filtering 
An XSS attack is accomplished by embedding malicious html, CSS, JavaScript or 
VBScript through some form of external input. The most cost-effective way to miti-
gate these malicious input is by passing all input through a filter, where all potential-
ly dangerous keywords like <script>, JavaScript commands, html markups, etc. are 
removed. Many XSS mitigating libraries exist to aid developers to build XSS secure 
sites. These include Microsoft Web Protection Library [49], HTML Purifier [50] etc. 
This method might have some drawbacks, in that the filter cannot tell the difference 
between non-malicious and malicious keyword usage. Thus, a non-malicious user 
like me including keywords (e.g. <script>) in my text will have it removed by the site 
filters. One way to solve this issue is by using escaping techniques.  
 
Escaping 
Filtering replaces potential malicious keywords with whitespace, escaping instead 
makes the keyword to be interpreted as pure data and nothing else. This way, key-
words like <script> alert (“don’t forget to sign out”) </ script>, <b> look here <\b> 
etc. can be displayed but will be interpreted by the browser as text for display pur-
pose only. Just like filtering, there are also various libraries that can be used for es-
caping keywords in different languages. Below are some examples of escaping dy-
namic keywords. 
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HTML Markup Escaped HTML Markup 
<h1></h1> &lt;h1&gt;&lt;/h1&gt; 
<b></b> &lt;b&gt;&lt;/b&gt; 
<br /> &lt;br /&gt; 
<html><\html> &lt;html&gt;&lt;\html&gt; 
<body><\body> &lt;body&gt;&lt;\body&gt; 
<script><\script> &lt;script&gt;&lt;\script&gt; 
Table 2: Escaping dynamic keywords 
 
5.3.2. Eavesdropping Attack 
 
One way to prevent application-level eavesdropping where Trojans/Spyware are ma-
liciously or intentionally installed on mobile devices is by scanning all files for mal-
ware before installation. Another way is by encrypting all sensitive data; this ensures 
the confidentiality of data even when the adversary eavesdrops on them. Encryption 
should also be adopted to mitigate network eavesdropping because it makes the reas-
sembling of stolen packets unusable to the adversary. 
 
5.3.3. Replay Attacks  
 
Mere encryption cannot be used to mitigate replay attacks since the adversary can 
simple replay the encrypted data (e.g. authentication data, login session etc.) without 
decrypting it. In order to make replay attacks impossible, it is necessary to introduce 
some random data to each transmission. Several mechanisms can be used or com-
bined to accomplish this [43].  
 
One Time Passwords 
One-time passwords, as the name implies, help create randomness of data. Each 
transmitted data will always be unique. 
 
Session token 
During a login session, a random session token can be sent from a server to the user 
attempting to login. The user carries out some form of computation using the session 
token and his password (e.g. appending and hashing them) and sends the result to the 
server. The server performs the same computation as the user and verifies if the re-
sults match. The method is able to counter replay attacks by sending a different ses-
sion token for every login session.  
 
Time Stamping 
Computing session tokens with time stamps makes it even more difficult for replay 
attacks to be carried out. This is because the time stamp of the login session will no 
longer be valid due to the time difference between when the login session was first 
used and when replayed by the adversary. 
 
5.3.4. Smishing and Vhishing Attacks 
 
It is necessary to prevent Smishing and Vhishing Attacks since its occurrence may 
affect the image and the potential customer base of a company. Customers who feel 
threatened about the privacy of their data may deter in using such services for fear of 
being duped.  
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Blocking 
In some Smishing attacks, users are tricked into opening links that redirect them to 
Smishing websites, were they become vulnerable to information theft. Organizations 
can protect themselves against this threat by proactively blocking redirection to 
Smishing sites from their network. This function exists in major browsers such as 
Internet explorer, Mozilla etc. and should be enabled to help prevent such attacks. 
 
Educate customers 
It is necessary that companies educate their customers about possible social engineer-
ing techniques that could be used by adversaries to steal their data. For instance, 
companies can set security policies such as “We will never request user authentica-
tion details (e.g. passwords, username) through email or phone”, and inform their 
customers about these policies. This method can therefore prove useful against miti-
gating Vhishing attacks. 
 
 
Data access restriction 
For instance, adversaries may target employees of corporate organizations with the 
aim of stealing customer information. The leakage of company sensitive data via 
employees can be limited or avoided by applying restrictions on the amount of cus-
tomer sensitive information they have access to.  
 
5.3.5. MITB attack 
  
One of the effective ways to protect the victim’s browsers or financial details against 
this attack is employing an out-of-band transaction verification. This form of transac-
tion verification ensures that the customer verifies his transaction to the host organi-
zation (say the bank) by making use of another channel of communication than the 
web browser. This channel could in particular be used to make a phone call where the 
voice and what he knows about the transaction are verified in order for the transac-
tion process to proceed.  
 
5.3.6. DoS attack 
 
One way to perform DoS attacks is to exhaust the mobile phone’s resources, for ex-
ample by flooding the Bluetooth mobile device with paring requests, which might 
lead to dropping of legitimate pairing requests if there is not enough resources to ac-
cept all incoming requests. This can be prevented by turning off Bluetooth pairing 
when not needed to prevent attacks from being launched at idle mobile phones. 
Another way is to allocate enough resources to handle large amounts of request. This 
however, is not practical due to the limitations on computing power and small memo-
ry of mobile phones. 
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6. Proposed method 
 
The aim of this study was to propose a secure platform-independent authentication 
and payment method for m-commerce applications. To achieve this, we reviewed 
previous studies that were conducted in the area of authentication and payment  
(Chapter 2), as well as reviewing what underlining methods, current existing authen-
ticating systems use (Chapter 4). We have found several plausible solutions to the 
problem, of which we propose the use of an OSP authentication method and two 
payment approaches. 
 
6.1. OSP 
 
OTP via SMS-Password authentication (OSP) method involves the use of the mul-
tiple authentication factors and communication channels for authentication. When 
using the OSP, a user provides his username and password, the OSP system sends a 
one-time password (OTP) to the user’s mobile device, the user completes the process 
by retrieving and providing the retrieved OTP. 
 
6.1.1. Requirements 
 
a. The authentication method implementation should be platform independent. One 
implementation should be deployable on different Smartphones (e.g. iPhone, 
BlackBerry, Android phone etc.) with little or no modifications. 
b. The authentication system must use at least two factors for authentication. For 
example, something the user knows (e.g. OTP, token) and something he has (e.g. 
a Smartphone, telephone number). An intruder, with access to only one factor, 
will not be able to authenticate himself as a legitimate user.  
c. In cases where one-time passwords (OTP) are used, secure cryptographically 
generated OTPs are required. 
d. All data been exchanged between an authenticated person/device and the verifier 
must be encrypted during the entire authentication process. 
e. In the case where passwords are used, users must be required to choose strong 
passwords. 
f. All communication between all involved systems must be encrypted with a strong 
form of encryption 
g. OTPs can only be used once 
h. OTPs must have a limited lifetime 
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6.1.2. Design 
 
Figure 9: OSP authentication process 
 
1. The user signs in with a username and password. 
2. M-commerce application requests for OTP generation from the OTP Module 
3. OTP module generates an OTP and sends it to the SMS gateway 
4. SMS gateway sends the received OTP to the user via SMS messaging 
5. The user enters OTP into M-commerce application 
6. M-commerce application verifies the received OTP with the OTP module 
7. OTP module verifies OTP and relays back the result to M-commerce application 
8. M-commerce application denies or grants access to the user based on result from 
OTP module. 
 
6.1.3. Pros and cons 
 
Pros 
a. If an intruder gets unauthorized access to the mobile device (something you 
have),  he still cannot successfully authenticate himself as the legitimate owner of 
the phone, since the application requires knowledge of the username and pass-
word (something you know) 
b. Likewise, if an intruder gets unauthorized access to the username and password, 
he still cannot successfully authenticate himself as the legitimate user without re-
trieving the OTP from the mobile phone. 
c. An authentication request by an intruder using a compromised username and 
password will be immediately detected by the legitimate user, since an OTP will 
be sent to his phone. 
 
Cons  
a. Latency of SMS messages is not constant. Thus, there might be some perfor-
mance issues. 
b. The cost of sending SMS messages may be too high to be used for m-commerce 
applications that don’t require high level of security. 
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6.1.4. Prototype 
 
 
                   
 
 
 
 
 
                   
 
 
Figure 10: OSP authentication prototype 
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The prototype is implemented as a solution for an m-commerce online applica-
tion/store that needs to authenticate buyers before they can make purchases. The pro-
totype is based on a client-server architecture with a very slim client. It was imple-
mented in ASP.NET and targeted at .NET framework 4. The solution uses a third 
party SMS gateway provider called CellSynt [51] for sending OTPs to buyers’ mo-
bile phones. All the OSP logic concerning cryptographic secure OTP generation, 
SMS sending and so on are located on the server side. The figure above shows a live 
run of the OSP solution prototype implementation. The scenario is an m-commerce 
store that sells electronics such as laptops, cameras etc. The system authenticates the 
buyer by requesting for is telephone number and password (first authentication fac-
tor). On receipt of a valid telephone number, the system generates an OTP and sends 
it to the registered buyer’s phone (second authenticating factor). The user retrieves 
and enters the OTP into the application and is granted access to purchase the item 
after successful verification of the OTP. The prototype has been tested on an iPhone 
and an Android OS with no change to the code. It is important to note that the proto-
type only implements certain parts of the OSP method for simplicity. Thus a com-
pleted version should implement and meet all requirements described in 6.1 such as 
encrypted data communication [51]. 
 
6.2. Secure payment approaches 
 
Payment processing is complicated and involves several parties and communications 
between them. In this section, we will look at different methods of adding financial 
transaction capabilities to m-commerce applications. An evaluation (based on securi-
ty and other factors) of these methods was also carried out and described in chapter 7.  
 
6.2.1. Understanding how payment works 
 
Making a payment with a credit card takes a few seconds. However, the amount of 
work that goes on at the background cannot be easily explained within a few minutes. 
A payment process involves several cooperating parties, several exchanges, cash ex-
change and so on. It also involves following the payment card industry data security 
standard (PCIDSS). Table 3 shows the PCIDSS[52] security requirements and  figure 
11 shows the data to be protected, the parties involved and a scenario of what hap-
pens from when a payer conducts a transaction with his or her credit card until the 
merchant receives the transferred amount. 
 
Secure payment data and requirements 
In order for merchants to be PCI compliant, they must carefully implement the 12 
requirements stated in the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS). 
Figure 11 shows the cardholder and authentication data that must be properly pro-
tected. Following that are the 12 requirements that each m-commerce business must 
implement. These requirements help to secure the m-commerce service network, pro-
tect cardholder data, maintain a vulnerability management program, implement 
strong access control measures, regularly monitor and test the m-commerce service 
network and maintain information security within the m-commerce organization 
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Figure 11: Card data to be protected [53] 
 
How to build and maintain a secure network 
Requirement 1 The cardholder and authentication data which is been stored, processed 
or transmitted within the m-commerce private network should be pro-
tected from outside untrusted networks. This should be done by setting 
up a firewall with secure configuration rules required to protect the 
private network. 
Requirement 2 Organizations should not retain or use vendor-supplied default authen-
tication parameters (e.g. passwords) or other settings. This reduces the 
risk of compromising the systems through the default passwords or set-
tings, which might be known outside the organization. 
How to protect cardholder data 
Requirement 3 The integrity, confidentiality of stored cardholder data should be pro-
tected at all times. This should be carried out by using cryptographically 
strong methods and keys for data encryption, hashing, masking and so 
on. This ensures that in situations where cardholder data are maliciously 
accessed, the intruder will still not be able to understand the content of 
the data without the right encryption keys. Organizations should also 
avoid storing unnecessary cardholder data except in cases where specif-
ically needed. 
Requirement 4 Transmission of cardholder data within an open domain such as the 
Internet must always be encrypted. A public domain is susceptible to 
various forms of malicious attacks such as man-in-the-middle, intercep-
tion etc. Thus, encrypting cardholder data gives assurance that only the 
intended recipient is able to use the data. 
How to maintain a vulnerability management program 
Requirement 5 Malicious software such as viruses, Trojans and worms are continuously 
evolving into different variants that target certain application vulnerabil-
ities. Organizations must handle these new threats by installing and 
regularly updating antivirus programs. 
Requirement 6 Develop secure systems and ensure that their security is always main-
tained at all times. This can be done by being up to date with security 
patches which eliminate new vulnerabilities that are discovered in the 
system. 
How to implement strong access control measures 
Requirement 7 Access to cardholder data by employees in an organization must solely 
be granted on a need to know bases.  Access must only be granted to 
the least amount of data required for an assignment. 
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Requirement 8 Unique identification numbers must be allocated to all employees with 
computer access. This will ensure accountability and easy tracing of de-
frauding employees, by going through their usage history.  
Requirement 9 Restrictions must be placed on access to physical cardholder data or 
critical systems. For example, temporary employees such as contract 
workers should not been given access to critical systems. This limits the 
danger of unauthorized persons removing sensitive hardware, such as 
hard disk containing sensitive cardholder data.    
How to regularly monitor and test networks 
Requirement 10 Mechanisms to prevent, detect, and minimize the impact of data com-
promise must be implemented in organizations that process, store and 
transmit cardholder data. These mechanisms include the ability to track 
and monitor all access within the local network and cardholder data. 
This ability to track and monitor helps in easy detection of unusual be-
havior within the network and thus helps to prevent or minimize the 
impact of data that might arise from such behaviors. 
Requirement 11 All security systems and processes must be regularly tested in order to 
be proactive in detecting vulnerabilities that might exist in the system. 
This puts you a step ahead of attackers who themselves are actively 
looking form vulnerabilities to exploit in your system. 
How to maintain an information security policy 
Requirement 12 The organization must maintain an information security policy that con-
tains security rules, best practices and regulations guiding how em-
ployees work. Employees should be aware of these policies and regular-
ly educated on them. 
Table 3:  PCI-DSS requirement  
 
Parties 
Merchant bank: A merchant bank is the financial organization that provided the m-
commerce firm (merchant) with a merchant account. The merchant bank receives 
credit card transactions and pays the required amount into the m-commerce firm 
merchant account. It does the deposition of the money into the merchant account 
even before the said amount is transferred to it from the cardholder’s issuing bank 
(see figure 12 below).  
 
Issuing bank: The issuing bank (e.g. SwedBank and SEB) is the financial organiza-
tion that provides credit cards to people for conducting purchases and other transac-
tions. In most cases, one can only acquire credit cards from banks where they have an 
account. Exceptions to this are American Express and Discover card associations 
which issue cards directly to individuals.  
 
Card associations (Brands): Card associations or sometime referred to as brands are 
the establishments such as MasterCard, Visa, American Express etc. They regulate 
and standardize the card payment industries by working together with different fi-
nancial and governmental stake holders. They do this by making rules on security 
requirements and interchange rate of financial transactions.  
 
Merchant processor: Merchant processors are the link between the m-commerce firm 
(merchant) and the rest of the parties involved in a financial transaction process. The 
merchant bank has access to the entire card brand associated with the merchant. It 
handles sending authentication request to the appropriate card issuing organization. It 
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also forwards approved financial transaction processing request to the merchant 
banks on behalf of the merchant (see figure 9) 
 
Payment process 
 
Figure 12: Payment process 
 
 Message Description 
1 The buyer chooses to pay for an item at an m-commerce store using a credit 
card (e.g. visa, MasterCard etc.). Inputs credit card details 
2 m-commerce application request  authentication by sending card information 
and cost of product (transaction details) to merchant processor 
3 Merchant processor detects card brand (visa, MasterCard etc.) based on 
cards first 6 digits, and sends an authorization request to the identified card 
association 
4 Card association identifies the (based on internal database) bank that issued 
the card, and sends the authorization  request to the issuing bank  
5 The issuing bank will either approve or decline the transaction based on their 
set criteria. The decision is sent back to the card association.  
6 The card association sends the decision back to the merchant processor  
7 The merchant processor relays the decision back to the m-commerce store 
8 In the case where the transaction was approved, the m-commerce applica-
tion sends it to the merchant processor for processing 
9 The merchant processor sends the transaction to a merchant bank where the 
m-commerce store has an account  
10 The merchant bank pays the amount involved in the transaction into the m-
commerce store account. It then requests an equivalent amount from the 
identified (see message 3) card association 
11 The card association re-sends the request for payment to the bank that is-
sued the card. 
12 The issuing bank deducts the requested amount from the buyers bank ac-
count tied to the credit card. It then transfers the amount to the card associa-
tion 
13 The card association transfers the money to the merchant bank 
* The m-commerce store returns transaction result (completed, pending, de-
nied etc.) to the buyer. This can take place any time after message 7, and 
based on whether the transaction was authorized or not 
 
Figure 13: Details of the entire payment process 
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6.2.2. PCI compliant approach  
 
In order for merchants to store, process or transmit payment cardholder data, they 
must implement the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS). This 
standard includes 12 best practices (requirements) for security management, policies, 
procedures, network architecture, software design and other critical protective meas-
ures. In the PCI compliant approach, the merchants carry out the processing, trans-
mission and storage of cardholder data. Thus, it is essential for any m-commerce ap-
plication using this approach to be PCI compliant. 
 
How it works 
Chapter 6.1.2 illustrates how the PCI compliant approach can be carried out. Another 
possibility is to have a gateway provider serves as a middle man between the m-
commerce store and the remaining parties in the payment process. 
 “Payment Gateways connect the Merchant to the bank or Processor that is acting as 
the front-end connection to the Card Associations”. “They are called Gateways be-
cause they take many inputs from a variety of different applications and route those 
inputs to the appropriate bank or Processor” [54].  
The choice of method to use is left to m-commerce store. However, both variants 
require that the m-commerce store is PCI complaint in order to be able to store, 
process or transmit cardholder data to other parties. Making use of a gateway also 
offers another way (using third party approach) of carrying out financial transaction 
in m-commerce applications. This approach is described in the nest section.  
 
6.2.3.  Third party approach 
 
This approach involves using the services of third party payment gateways to facili-
tate credit card payments. Examples of companies that offer such solutions include 
PayPal and Google.  
 
How it works 
The third party gateway provides the m-commerce site an abstraction of the payment 
process. It does this by providing the m-commerce site with a merchant account that 
handles the security of transaction information (e.g. credit card numbers), imple-
ments PCI compliance requirements and facilitates communication to the card asso-
ciation and card issuing banks. It also offers quick and easy use of its services by 
providing APIs which can be accessed via secure https requests from the merchants 
store. Integrating such third party payment capabilities to an m-commerce web-site 
only takes few hours and average programming skills. This makes it a preferred 
choice for small and medium m-commerce businesses, which lack highly skilled IT 
staff and resources. The picture below shows our prototype implementation which 
was done using PayPal [55] as a third party payment gateway. 
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Figure 14: Third party approach 
 
The prototype is implemented as a solution for an m-commerce online applica-
tion/store that needs to accept payment from customers. The prototype is based on 
client-server architecture with a very slim client. It was implemented in ASP.NET 
and targeted at .NET framework 4. The solution uses a third party payment gateway 
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provider called PayPal for accepting card payments. The figure above shows a live 
run of the “Third party approach” payment solution. The scenario in figure 14 above 
is an m-commerce store that sells electronics such as laptops, cameras and a buyer 
who wishes to purchase a camera. The user is first authenticated (see chapter 6.4), 
and then redirected to PayPal based on the payment option chosen. He pays for the 
camera by entering required card details and is redirected back to the m-commerce 
store after completion of the payment. The prototype has been tested on an iPhone 
and Android OS with no change to the code. It is important to note that the prototype 
only implements one-way authentication (HTTPS) between the m-commerce store 
and PayPal for simplicity. Thus a completed version should implement a secure two-
way authenticated HTTPS connection between the m-commerce store and PayPal. 
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7. Evaluation 
 
An exploratory methodology (see chapter 3) which involved data collection, analysis, 
validation and evaluation was adopted in this study. This chapter describes the evalu-
ation carried out of the OSP authentication method described in chapter 6.1.The 
evaluation involves an analysis of how well the method mitigates attacks from the 
threat model presented in chapter 5. Also described is the evaluation of the PCI 
Compliant and Third Party payment approach presented in chapter 6.2.2 and 6.2.3. 
 
7.1. OSP authentication method evaluation 
 
The various attacks identified in the threat model include XSS, Eavesdropping, Re-
play, Man in the Browser, DoS, Vhishing and Smishing attacks. Below is the security 
analysis of each attack in relation to the OSP authentication method. 
 
7.1.1. XSS attack  
 
An XSS attack can be used to insert malicious scripts or commands into m-
commerce applications in order to steal user data. In the case of the OSP authentica-
tion method, the security of the method depends on the inability of an adversary to 
compromise authentication data (username, password, OTP). Thus, it is required that 
XSS mitigating techniques (see threat section) should be implemented in any m-
commerce applications that use the OSP authentication method. However the OSP 
method is by itself secure against XSS attacks using OTP. For example, even if an 
adversary is successful in compromising an m-commerce site and is able to steal a 
legitimate username and password, as illustrated in the figure below, he will still not 
be able to be authenticated using the stolen credentials. This is assured based on the 
two-factor authentication employed by the OSP method. The adversary cannot log in 
since he is not in possession of the generated OTP and the legitimate user will find 
out that his account is compromised when he receives the SMS. 
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Figure 15: Mitigating XSS attack 
 
7.1.2. Eavesdropping Attack  
 
Eavesdropping attacks as explained in chapter 5.2.4, can either take place at the ap-
plication or network level. A successfully installed eavesdropping spyware can steal 
usernames and passwords via key loggers and even retrieve or access stored one-time 
passwords. If this is allowed to happen, then the security of the OSP method which 
depends on the secrecy of passwords and OTPs is at risk. However, the OSP method 
was designed with preventive measures which eliminate the possibility of this to oc-
cur. One of the countermeasures is to use a security feature provided by the CellSynt 
SMS gateway. This feature allows sending the OTP as a flash message which is only 
displayed and not stored in the user's inbox. The main aim of this is to eliminate the 
possibility of storing retrieving the SMS from the inbox of the mobile phone. This 
makes it impossible for spyware (which have the capabilities of stealing stored SMS) 
to retrieve the sensitive OTP. However, a drawback with using SMS based flash 
messages is that the implementation might vary depending on the mobile phone 
model, operator and other factors. Therefore, individual tests should be carried out to 
see how secure the different implementations of flash messages are against spywares. 
Another measure which has been implemented to mitigate eavesdropping is to ensure 
that all communications involving authentication and afterwards are encrypted (using 
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https). This makes is impossible for adversaries to use packet sniffers to intercept and 
reassemble meaningful data. 
 
7.1.3. Replay Attacks 
 
This attack involves the interception of data between two or more parties and the 
malicious use of that data at a later time. Interception can occur either in real-time 
during active communication between the involved parties, or by obtaining commu-
nicated data at a later time from either of the concerned parties. There are several 
known techniques for mitigating replay attacks (chapter 5.3.3). One such approach is 
the use of OTP which is a key feature of the OSP authentication method. During the 
process of authentication with the OSP, an OTP is sent from the m-commerce site to 
the customer’s mobile phone. The customer then authenticates himself by sending the 
OTP back to the m-commerce site. The interception of the OTP by an adversary to be 
used later in a replay attack will be unsuccessful since an OTP is only valid once and 
also only for a short period of time. 
 
7.1.4. Smishing Attacks  
 
A Smishing attack (see chapter 5.2.4) uses SMS messaging in deceiving 
unsuspecting users to disclose sensitive information. This form of attack relies 
heavily on social engineering techniques. For example, an adversary can send a text 
message to a certain bank customer claiming to be an employee and requesting for 
account details (e.g. credit card number). The adversary can then illegally use the 
credit card information to make unauthorized purchases.  
The Smishing Attack which is a socially oriented attack cannot be solely mitigated 
by a technical authentication method such as the OSP. Therefore, social engineering 
mitigating techniques must be adopted at the organizational level. For example, 
security policies can be put in place which aims to educate customers and employees 
about the dangers and ways of avoiding Smishing Attacks (see chapter 5.3.4). 
 
7.1.5. Vhishing Attacks 
 
In the case of Vhishing attacks, the OSP is not designed to make use of voice 
recognition as the third factor needed for authentication. So an adversary will not be 
successful in using voice messaging system to try and deceive customers since the 
entire process of authentication is well known to them. Customers should to be 
educated about not giving their credit card details to any person or voice automated 
machine requesting them. In a nutshell, OSP alone is not enough to mitigate both 
Smishing and Vhishing and based on that, extra mitigating techniques must be 
adopted. 
 
7.1.6. Man in the Browser Attack 
 
Man in The Browser (MITB) attacks were specifically designed to beat strong 
multiple factor authenticating methods such as the OSP. This claim is supported by 
statistics which show that MITB attacks have been more frequent in countries 
(Germany, the Nether-lands, Spain, etc.) where two-factor authentication are used for 
online banking. The reason why the MITB have been successful against two-factor 
authentication is that it does not attack the authentication process itself. It rather 
allows a bank application to successfully authenticate a user, and then attacks the 
subsequent transactions that occur between the user and the bank. This, combined 
with its stealthy nature makes it impossible for the OSP and other multiple factor 
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authenticating methods to protect against it without additional security measures. 
One of such additional security measure is out Out-of-band communication which 
aims to verify user transactions (not authentication) through other means and 
channels. 
  
7.1.7. DoS Attack 
 
 Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are outside the scope of the OSP authentication 
method, and is another attack type which is known to be difficult to protect against. 
One of the basic reasons for this is the fact that DoS attacks are mostly done by 
carrying out legitimate operations in extremely large proportions (for example 
exhausting CPU time or network or memory resources). One solution to this problem 
could be planning for adequate resources to accommodate this extremely large 
amount of operations. This will definitely solve the problem but, such extreme 
amount of operations may never happen in the life time of the system, which means a 
mere waste of resources. Thus, an organization will have to make a tradeoff between 
security (preventing DoS attacks) and cost (providing only required resources) when 
designing their system.  
 
7.1.8. Summary 
 
Threats category Threats Attacks Mitigation OSP 
Virus  WinCE/Duts N/A N/A N/A 
Worms  Commwarrior 
 iPhone-Ikee-B 
 Megoro 
 
XSS 
 
Filtering, Escaping 
 
√ 
DoS Increase resources X 
Trojans  Zitmo 
 Geinimi 
 JiFake 
Smishing 
 
Blocking, Educating, 
Access restriction 
X 
MITB OOB X 
Spyware  Cell phone  
 Trusters  
 NeoCall 
Eavesdropping  
 
Scanning, Encryption 
 
√ 
Replay OTP, Time stamping, 
MAC, Session token 
√ 
Figure 16: OSP security overview (√ - Mitigation possible, X – Mitigation not possible) 
 
7.2. Payment approach evaluation 
 
The two approaches presented in chapter 6 are currently the most widely used forms 
of integrating payment capabilities into m-commerce sites. This is due to the suitabil-
ity to various businesses and their large expanding user base. What approach is 
adopted depends on the size, time to market, security policies, category etc. of the m-
commerce site.  We have evaluated the two approaches based on their security and 
other important properties with a view of helping prospective adopters choose an 
appropriate approach. It is also important to note that the economy, technology, 
threats and payment methods are continuous evolving. 
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Figure 17: PCI compliant vs. Third party Approaches 
 
7.2.1. Security 
 
The security of the two different approaches above was evaluated based on the secu-
rity requirements contained in the PCIDSS. PCIDSS was selected since it is a stan-
dard focused on the past and constantly evolving threats faced by payment systems 
and organizations. These requirements are also legally binding for any organization 
who wishes to conduct financial transactions electronically. Both approaches when 
adopted as instructed in this study can be said to meet the PCIDSS.  
 
The PCI compliant approach as the name implies involves the implementation and 
compliance with the entire requirement stated in the PCIDSS documentation (see 
chapter 6.2.1). The third party approach also aims to be PCI compliant, but does this 
by using the services of third party payment sites (payment gateways) that are al-
ready PCI compliant. One gray area in the use these approaches is how well they are 
implemented. Implementing the PCI compliant approach requires a decent amount of 
security knowledge and constant assessment to ensure that all parts of the require-
ment are fulfilled. Therefore, evaluation should be an ongoing process that should be 
carried out periodically. This also applies to third party approaches, but the responsi-
bility to ensure that the payment gateway is always PCI compliant, lies with the third 
party site. In the long run, the third party approach will be easier to implement and 
maintain. However, both approaches are equally secure if the implementations are 
done following the requirements to specifications. 
 
7.2.2. Development Time 
 
One important factor in the development of IT systems is time to market. Organiza-
tions are always trying to release their products as soon as possible, in order to gain 
an edge over competitors. This makes the development time of such products critical 
in the attainment of this goal. Adaptation of the PCI Compliant Approach is a lengthy 
process in comparison to the Third Party Approach. An m-commerce site hoping to 
integrate payment capabilities into their site within a short period of time is better off 
using the Third Party Approach. This conclusion is only valid for organizations im-
plementing the payment systems for the first time where the expertise and compe-
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tence of implementing the PCI requirements are not yet present. In cases where the 
organizations have used the PCI Compliant Approach a number of times on different 
systems, then the development time will the same or shorter than using the Third 
Party Approach. 
 
7.2.3. Cost 
 
It might be obvious at this stage what approach will be more expensive to implement, 
but it is still important to discuss the cost of the two approaches. IT security firms 
such as Emagined Security [56] and Fortrex Technologies [57]. have given three 
main categories for analyzing PCI compliance cost [58]. These include upgrading 
security infrastructure such as firewalls and antivirus software, undergoing an as-
sessment of the organizations compliance with the PCI DSS and sustaining com-
pliance with the PCI DSS. The cost of security infrastructure and sustaining com-
pliance might vary to a large degree from one firm to another based on the difference 
in size and other factors. However, a report by Ponemon Institute in March 2010 
showed the cost of assessment for large organizations to be in the range of $100,000 
to $500,000 per annum [59]. All this show that there is a considerable cost involved 
in the PCI Compliance Approach. In the Third Party Approach, the cost of been PCI 
Compliant is negligible since the responsibility to be PCI Compliant resides with the 
third party gateway provider. The makes the Third Party approach a preferred choice 
when cost is an issue for the organizations requiring a payment solution. 
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8. Conclusion  
 
The technology improvement and wide spread use of mobile phones has led to the 
growth of m-commerce.  M-commerce applications are used in social networking, 
online stores, and financial applications. The work conducted in this study involved 
(1) proposing and implementing a suitable secure platform-independent authentica-
tion method and (2) implementation of a prototype platform-independent payment 
approach for m-commerce applications. The prototype implementation has shown 
that the proposed authentication method and third party payment approach can be 
implemented within a short time and with as little as two developers. This makes the 
authentication and payment methods appropriate for small to large m-commerce 
businesses. These goals were accomplished by investigating the following problems 
areas:  
 
 What are the security threats that are currently faced by m-commerce sys-
tems? 
 
During our study, we discovered a number of security threats (see chapter 5) that are 
faced in the mobile industry. They include Viruses, Trojans, Worms and Spyware. 
These threats are continuously evolving into different variants in order to circumvent 
current protective security measures. The impact of these threats ranges from mere 
inconveniences like unwanted messages to severe implications such as identity theft, 
financial losses and national security breaches. It is not possible to have a threat-free 
m-commerce industry due to the tradeoffs that must be taken into consideration. Tra-
deoffs include compromises between security and performance or usability or costs. 
Based on the findings of the study, we have come to the conclusion that technology 
alone cannot be used to mitigate these threats. All practical solutions must include a 
security policy that covers and combines technology and social engineering best 
practices.  
 
 What are the necessary security requirements that must be met by a platform-
independent authentication and payment system? 
 
Authentication and payment systems must provide a high level of security due to the 
sensitive functions they perform. Studies carried out by researchers have stressed the 
need for a strong method of authentication due to the failures of weak form of au-
thentications such as password systems (See chapter 2). In order to achieve a strong 
authentication method, it is necessary to identify and understand what needs to be 
protected, possible attacks, how to protect vulnerable points and a ways to detect 
attacks. These methods can also be made more resilient to attacks by incorporating 
multiple authentication factors and communication channels. Most importantly, the 
limitations of the authentication method used must be clearly understood. In the case 
of the proposed OSP authentication method, security of the method only involves 
authentication verification but not transaction verification. This is one of the reasons 
why it was only able to mitigate some of the threats identified in this study (See 
chapter 7.1.5), while other mechanisms (e.g. education, access restriction etc.) were 
required to provide mitigation against the remaining threats. 
 
Requirements for payments systems are straightforward based on our findings. These 
have been properly documented in the PCI DSS document (See chapter 6.2). Howev-
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er, the challenges to organizations are the time it takes, cost involved and ensuring 
proper implementation of the requirements contained in the document. With that in 
mind, we recommend that small startup organizations will be better off starting with 
the third party approach.  They can later change to the PCI compliant approach, when 
they are matured enough to adequately tackle the challenges stated above.  
    
 What are the current authentication methods/solutions available? 
 
Based on the data collection and analysis carried out in this study, we were able to 
identify three major authentication methods. These methods include single factor, 
single sign-on and multiple factor authentication methods. It is no secret today the 
low level of security that single factor (password) authentication methods provide.  
Despite these shortcomings, this method is still widely in use today. Single sign-on 
involves the process where a user only needs to authenticate himself to a central third 
party, in order to be authenticated to other service providers. This authentication me-
thod provides ease of use to users, but it can also be argued that this is at the expense 
of security. If the communication between the user and the central authentication 
systems becomes compromised, then the authentication process with other service 
providers will be at risk. Multiple factor authentication (chapter 2.2 and 2.3) aims to 
solve the various problems associated with single factor methods by adding another 
layer of security to the authentication process. The method involves the use of some-
thing the user knows (e.g. OTP) and something the user has which improves the 
strength of the authentication process. 
 
The methods can be found in use in several existing solutions or products today. 
These include AcrotOTP (e.g. Multiple factor), Accumulate Mobile (e.g. Multiple 
factor), Authentify (e.g. Multiple factor), WebSEAL single sign-on (e.g. Single Sign-
on) and PayPal (e.g. Single factor). These solutions also incorporate other security 
mechanisms such as multiple channels, encryption, and certificates. These additional 
security mechanisms are required to cover other security vulnerabilities that the me-
thods do not protect against. 
 
 What are the current payment methods/solutions available? 
 
One of the aims of this thesis is to investigate and propose a suitable platform inde-
pendent payment method for m-commerce application. During data collection, we 
came across several payment methods and solutions that could be adopted for the 
purpose above. It became obvious at an early stage of our research that the online 
payment service provider was what we needed to achieve a platform independent 
payment method. We came to this conclusion for two reasons (1) it supports a plat-
form independent solution. (2) It is suitable for large and small m-commerce organi-
zations based on its support for micro and large payment possibilities. 
 
We were able to identify two payment solutions that could be used to provide a plat-
form independent payment solution. These are the PCI compliant approach and the 
third party approach (chapter 6.2). These two solutions were evaluated with respect 
to security, development time and cost (chapter 7.2). The choice of what approach 
should be taken is depends on which of the above properties the organizations priori-
tizes. However, we recommend that organizations should aim to switch to a PCI 
compliant approach only when they become mature enough to undergo the com-
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pliance process. The reason for this recommendation is that implementing the securi-
ty best practices contained in the PCI DSS (chapter 6.2), does not only improve the 
security of the payment process but also of the entire organization. 
   
8.1. Current and future work 
 
We have proposed the use of OSP as a way of achieving a secure platform indepen-
dent authentication method for m-commerce applications. The security of this me-
thod has been evaluated by investigating how well it mitigates known attacks. These 
attacks include XSS, DoS, Smishing, MITB, Eavesdropping and Replay Attacks. The 
method successfully mitigates XSS, Eavesdropping but was not able to do eliminate 
Smishing, DoS and MITB attacks. The reason for this is that OSP aims to protect the 
process of verifying that a user is who he claims to be, while the three unmitigated 
attacks are directed at other areas outside the authentication process. Therefore, other 
mechanisms such as encryption, Out of Band calls are needed in order to protect 
against these attacks (chapter 7.1.5). To conclude, organizations should endeavor to 
combine the OSP (which contains security features such as multiple channels and 
factors, OTP etc.) with these other security mechanisms in order achieve greater se-
curity of their assets. 
 
Future research can also focus on extending the OSP to include these mechanisms in 
order to protect against the three unmitigated attacks. More work should also be car-
ried out to investigate how well the OSP authentication method mitigates attacks that 
were not covered in this study.  
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